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Abstract: Globalization and financial integration allows a more efficient 
allocation of  capital  in  economies.  However,  integrated  financial  markets 
contribute to the dissemination of financial contagion among the financially 
integrated states. The world financial crisis has uncovered the lack of an 
efficient system of financial supervision. The paper is focused on the analysis 
of  the  impact  of  the  world  financial  crisis  on  the  systems  of  financial 
supervision in the EU, the USA and the Czech Republic. We initially describe 
the contemporary financial crisis. Then we focus on the system of financial 
supervision in the EU, the USA and the Czech Republic. We conclude that the 
system  of  financial  supervision  in  the  EU  must  be  reformed  in  order  to 
coordinate the different national systems of all EU member states. The same 
holds  for  the  financial  supervision  in  the  USA  that  is  quite  complicated 
because  of  the  dual  federal-state  banking  system.  The  Czech  system  of 
financial supervision does not have to be reformed, because it was modified 
in  2006  (before  the  crisis)  and  now  it  is  very  simple,  definite  and  well-
functioning. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since  July  2007  the  world  financial 
system  has  been  experiencing  substantial 
turbulences  that  were  triggered  by 
shortcomings  in  the  U.S.  subprime 
mortgage  market  and  lack  of  financial 
supervision.  This  has  led  to  problems  in 
many  segments  of  the  money  and  credit 
markets all over the world. 
The  Federal  Reserve  System  (Fed), 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  and 
European  nations’  central  banks  have  not 
successfully  managed  the  area  of  
macro-prudential supervision and regulation 
during the past decade. Like the Fed, they 
failed  to  foresee  the  financial  crisis  and 
consequently  they  failed  to  prevent  it. 
Hence, the Fed, the ECB and most other EU 
central  banks  contributed  to  the 
unsustainable credit and asset market boom 
that  turned  to  the  world  financial  crisis 
which  started  in  August  2007.  They  kept 
interest rates too low for too long, failed to 
control the excessive growth of credit and 
the  broad  monetary  aggregates,  and  were 
not able to diagnose the excessive leverage, 
and  also  the  maturity  and  liquidity 
mismatch  that  originated  in  the  US  and 
European  banking  sector  and  especially 
shadow banking sector balance sheets. 
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international  level  have  been  trying  to 
identify  the  main  weaknesses  in  the 
financial system in order to develop better 
policy responses to strengthen the financial 
stability in the world. 
The paper is focused on the analysis of 
the impact of the world financial crisis on 
the systems of financial supervision in the 
EU, the USA and the Czech Republic. The 
structure of the article is as follows. The 
first  chapter  is  an  introduction.  In  the 
second chapter, we describe the originate-
to-distribute model and the contemporary 
financial  crisis.  Then  we  focus  on  the 
system of financial supervision in the EU, 
the  USA  and  the  Czech  Republic  in  the 
third  chapter.  The  last  chapter  is  the 
conclusion reached. 
 
2. Financial Crisis 
 
2.1. The Originate-to-Distribute Model 
 
In  the  originate-to-distribute  model  (the 
OTD model) banks do not hold the loans they 
originate until the maturity but they repackage 
and  distribute  them  to  different  types  of 
investors  through  the  issuance  of  structured 
financial products (the securitisation process). 
 
Fig. 1. Main Players in the originate-to-distribute model 
Source: European Central Bank (2008, p. 15) 
 
The banks thus have the option to bear or to 
transfer the risk associated with these loans. A 
very simple structure of the OTD  model is 
demonstrated in Figure 1. 
There are four major groups of players in 
the  OTD  model:  originators, 
intermediaries, investors, and third parties. 
Originators  cooperate  directly  with 
borrowers and produce assets that are sold 
to  the  intermediaries.  The  intermediaries 
set up the special purpose vehicles (SPVs), 
which  purchase  the  originated  assets  and 
issue  securities  backed  by  these  assets 
(asset-backed  securities).  Investors  buy 
these securities issued by the SPVs. There 
are a lot of third-party service providers, 
Credit  Rating  Agencies  (CRAs),  trustees, 
underwriters etc. These subjects do not buy 
or  sell  the  assets;  they  perform  specific 
tasks for the various model participants. 
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Fig. 2. Securitisation in Europe and the USA from 2000 to 2009 (€ Billion)  
Includes data concerning ABS, CDO, MBS (RMBS+CMBS). 
Source: Association for Financial Markets in Europe/European Securitisation Forum 
 
The prevalence of the OTD model over 
the past twenty years has led to a growth of 
the structured financing to a great extent in 
the  USA  and  partly  in  Europe;  the 
European structured financial market thus 
remains  smaller  than  the  U.S.  market. 
Figure 2 illustrates this fact. 
The issuance of structured products was 
much  higher  in  the  USA  than  in  Europe 
until  the  end  of  2007.  However,  the 
volumes  were  almost  the  same  in  2008 
(€711,3 billion in Europe, €933,6 billion in 
the USA), because Europe experienced an 
improvement in the markets of structured 
products, while the U.S. issuance was less 
than  one  half  of  the  issuance  in  the 
previous  year.  In  2009,  the  situation  is 
opposite, i.e. higher issuance in the USA in 
comparison with Europe. According to the 
Association  for  Financial  Markets  in 
Europe  (the  former  European 
Securitisation  Forum),  some  fundamental 
issues are still preventing a recovery of the 
European securitisation market (a reduced 
investor  base,  the  fact  that  originators 
utilise  more  competitive  sources  of 
funding etc). 
 
2.2 The Present Financial Crisis 
 
According  to  De  Larosière  J.  et  al 
(2009),  financial  innovations  (including 
the  OTD  model),  rapid  credit  expansion, 
high  liquidity,  low  interest  rates,  and 
insufficient  financial  supervision  have 
been the major factors behind the present 
financial crisis. Though the credit volume 
grew rapidly and excess liquidity showed 
up  in  unduly  rising  asset  prices,  central 
banks  felt  no  need  to  tighten  their 
monetary policies. Because of low interest 
rates,  investors  sought  higher  yield 
opportunities.  Therefore,  financial 
institutions  developed  more  innovative 
(but  also  more  risky)  products,  thus 
generating  a  sizeable  expansion  of 
leverage within the world financial system.  
Moreover, both financial institutions and 
central  banks  failed  in  the  assessment  of 
risk (partly due to extreme complexity of 
structured  financial  products),  hence 
financial  institutions  overestimated  their 
ability  to  manage  the  risks  and 
underestimated the volume of capital they 
should hold and no bank expected a total 
freezing  of  the  interbank  money  market. 
CRAs  influenced  the  risk  perception  by 
giving high ratings to structured financial 
products,  the  same  excellent  rating  they 
gave  to  almost  riskless  government  or 
corporate bonds.  
The  OTD  model  can  bring  a  lot  of 
benefits. However, a poor risk assessment 
by  CRAs,  an  insufficient  valuation  by Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 3 (52) - 2010 • Series V 
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investors,  and  opacity  of  information  on 
complex  structured  finance  products 
resulted  in  substantial  rating  downgrades 
in July 2007 and subsequently in the fall of 
the value of underlying assets and a loss of 
investors’  confidence.  The  OTD  model 
broke  down  the  relationship  between 
lenders  and  borrowers,  diverted  attention 
away from the borrower’s ability to repay 
a  debt  towards  lending  against  collateral 
thus leading to lower lending standards. It 
also  created  conflicts  of  interest  that 
market  discipline  failed  to  correct. 
Originators of bank loans failed to require 
a sufficient documentation of income and 
ability  to  pay.  Intermediaries  encouraged 
the  underwriting  standards  to  decline  by 
not  setting  high  standards  for  the  loans 
they were willing to buy from originators. 
Investors trusted the CRAs. This huge lack 
of  transparency  prevented  market 
participants  from  understanding  the  full 
nature of the risks they accepted.  
This  process  was  accompanied  by 
insufficiently supervised mortgage lending, 
extremely  low  interest  rates,  and 
unprecedented  financing  based  on 
securitisation  techniques  in  the  USA. 
Moreover, the U.S. government promoted 
the government sponsored entities (GSEs) 
Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  to  provide 
mortgages  to  low  income  households. 
Within  Europe,  mortgage  lending  was 
more responsible. 
This  has  led  to  great  global  financial 
market  imbalance  and  uncovered  serious 
limitations  in  the  existing  supervisory 
framework globally, both in a national and 
cross-border  context.  Strong  competition 
among  world  financial  centres  also 
contributed  to  hesitation  or  reluctance  of 
national  regulators  and  supervisors.  The 
surveillance of the International Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  did  not  function  properly 
either.  Insufficient  regulatory  and 
supervisory  abilities  combined  with 
different  national  systems  of  supervision 
led to an increased interest of international 
authorities  to  improve  the  system  of 
financial regulation and supervision. 
3. Financial Supervision in the EU, the 
USA and the Czech Republic – Response 
to the Financial Crisis 
 
3.1 Financial Supervision in the EU 
 
The  system  of  financial  regulation  and 
supervision in the EU has been based on 
separate systems of member states so far. 
Now we are facing the financial crisis, the 
EU representatives are convinced that this 
nation-based  system  has  to  be  changed. 
Therefore,  their  effort  is  focused  on  the 
revision  (or  creation)  of  relevant 
legislation  in  order  to  move  from  the 
present  separate  nation-based  systems  to 
the  common  European-based  system  of 
financial supervision. 
The  European  Commission  adopted  an 
important  package  of  legislation  to 
significantly strengthen the supervision of 
the financial sector in Europe in September 
and  October  2009.  [6]  [7]  This  package 
represents a reaction of the Commission to 
the  current  financial  crisis  in  order  to 
remove  shortcomings  in  the  European 
financial supervision. The main weakness 
in the EU’s supervisory framework is the 
fragmentation along national lines despite 
the existence of a European single market. 
In  other  words,  interconnected  complex 
market  risks  were  not  properly  analysed, 
nor were the consequences drawn for the 
regulatory  and  supervisory  policy. 
Therefore, these tendencies are an integral 
part  of  the  Commission’s  strategy  for 
preventing future crises. 
This  new  European  supervisory  system 
is based on the “de Larosière Report“. [2] 
In  November  2008,  the  Commission 
mandated a High Level Group chaired by 
Jacques  de  Larosière  to  prepare 
recommendations  on  how  to  improve 
European  supervisory  system  to  better 
protect its citizens and renew trust in the 
European financial system. The final report 
which was presented on 25 February 2009 
introduced a new vision for a new system 
of European financial supervision. The aim 
of this vision is to strengthen cooperation KUČEROVÁ, Z.: The impact of financial crisis on financial supervision…  275 
and  coordination  among  national 
supervisors  through  the  creation  of  a 
European  authority  responsible  for 
overseeing risk in the financial system and 
new European Supervisory Authorities.  
In  the  past,  the  interest  of  financial 
supervision has been elaborated only at the 
micro-level,  focused  on  assessing  the 
balance  sheets  of  individual  financial 
institutions  without  omitting  interactions 
among  institutions  and  the  broader 
financial  system.  Therefore,  the  new 
legislation  creates  a  European  Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor and detect 
threats  and  risks  that  arise  from  macro-
economic  developments  and  from  the 
financial system of the EU as a whole (the 
so called “macro-prudential supervision”). 
It has a critical function to issue early risk 
warnings to be rapidly acted on. The ESRB 
has the power to issue recommendations to 
EU  Member  States  and  their  national 
supervisors  and  to  the  three  European 
Supervisory Authorities. The ESRC is also 
responsible  for  monitoring  compliance 
with its recommendations; subjects have to 
comply or explain why they have not done 
so.  The  creation  of  the  ESRB  addresses 
one  of  the  weaknesses  revealed  by  the 
financial crisis, i.e. the vulnerability of the 
European  financial  system  to 
interconnected,  complex,  sectoral  and 
cross-sectoral systemic risks. The ESRB is 
fully  accountable  to  the  Council  and  the 
European  Parliament  in  the  form  of 
reporting  to  these  institutions  regularly, 
(the  so  called  formal  accountability). 
However,  the  ESRB  has  no  direct 
responsibilities in the area of managing the 
crisis.  The  ESRB  consists  of  the  central 
bank  governors  of  the  27  EU  Member 
States,  the  President  of  the  ECB,  the 
chairpersons  of  the  three  European 
Supervisory  Authorities  of  the  ESFS, 
senior  representatives  of  the  national 
supervisory  authorities,  a  member  of  the 
Commission,  and  the  Economic  and 
Financial  Committee  chairperson  as  an 
observer  in  ESRB  meetings.  This 
composition  of  the  ESRB  makes  the 
national  central  banks  the  dominant 
players  in  this  system  of  the  macro-
prudential  financial  stability  framework.  
The ERSB should cooperate with the IMF, 
the  Financial  Stability  Board  and  third 
country  counterparts  in  order  to  give  a 
worldwide system of early warnings. 
The  second  institution  created  by  the 
new legislation is a European System of 
Financial  Supervisors  (ESFS)  for  the 
supervision  of  individual  financial 
institutions  and  firms  and  protecting 
consumers  of  financial  services  (the 
“micro-prudential  supervision”).  It  is 
composed  of  a  network  of  national 
financial  supervisors  and  three  new 
European  Supervisory  Authorities  for  the 
banking,  securities  and  insurance  and 
occupational pensions sectors: a European 
Banking  Authority  (EBA),  a  European 
Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions 
Authority  (EIOPA),  and  a  European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
This large network should be based on the 
principles  of  partnership,  flexibility  and 
subsidiarity. It tries to enhance trust among 
national supervisors by ensuring, that host 
supervisors have a possibility to participate 
in setting the policies relating to financial 
stability  and  consumer  protection. 
Thereby,  the  cross-border  risk  could  be 
addressed more effectively. The focal point 
for  day-to-day  supervision  rests  at  the 
national  level.  Thus,  the  national 
supervisors  remain  responsible  for  the 
supervision of individual entities (they will 
still  monitor  the  capital  adequacy  etc.). 
This network approach to micro-prudential 
supervision,  where  new  European 
Supervisory  Authorities  cooperate  with 
national financial supervisors, is proposed 
in line with the de Larosière Report. The 
solution  of  the  full  centralisation  of 
supervision at the EU level has no support 
of the Commission. 
The  aim  of  this  reform  is  to  ensure  a 
smoother interaction of supervision at the 
macro-prudential  and  micro-prudential 
levels.  The  ESRB  would  need  a  timely Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 3 (52) - 2010 • Series V 
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flow  of  micro-level  data  in  fulfilling  its 
role  as  a  macro-prudential  supervisor, 
while  the  ESFS  (including  national 
supervisors)  would  benefit  from  the 
ESRB’s  macro-prudential  data.  Building 
these  two  pillars  of  the  new  system  of 
European financial supervision is essential 
to  ensure  a  fully  connected  macro-micro 
supervisory  framework.  However,  there 
are differences in the national transposition 
of  Community  law  stemming  from 
exceptions,  derogations,  additions  or 
ambiguities in current directives that must 
be  identified  and  removed  in  order  to 
define  and  apply  one  harmonised  set  of 
standards within the EU. 
This new European financial supervisory 
framework  must  be  fully  responsible  to 
political authorities in the EU. This system 
must  be  based  on  high  supervisory 
standards, applied equivalently, fairly and 
consistently to all markets actors. It must 
also respect the independence of national 
financial supervisors. 
The G20 Group has decided to reinforce 
the global arrangements for protecting the 
world  financial  stability  and  established 
the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB),  the 
successor to the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF),  expected  to  cooperate  with  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (MMF)  to 
provide  early  warnings  of  risks  at  the 
global level. [6] [7] 
 
3.2 Financial Supervision in the USA 
 
Fed and its supervisory functions in the 
USA  have  evolved  to  create  a  U.S. 
banking  and  financial  structure  which  is 
quite unique. The Glass Steagall Act was 
largely  responsible  for  this  unique 
structure.  This  Act  separated  commercial 
and investment banking from 1933 in order 
to  prevent  another financial  crisis  arising 
from  the  large  number  of  bank  failures 
during the Great Depression. The securities 
functions  of  commercial  banks  were 
limited  to  underwriting  and  dealing  in 
municipal  government  debt.  On  the 
contrary, investment banks could engage in 
securities  and  underwriting,  but  were 
prohibited  from  taking  deposits.  The  act 
was  repealed  in  1999  when  the  Gramm 
Leach  Bliley  Financial  Modernisation 
Act was signed into law. The reason is that 
modern technologies have started to erase 
the  borders  between  commercial  and 
investment banking. Under this Act, U.S. 
bank holding companies can transform into 
financial  holding  companies  which  can 
consist  of  commercial  banks,  investment 
banks and insurance subsidiaries.  
The U.S. legislation limited the extent to 
which banks could set up branches. It was 
quite obvious in the other banking systems 
in developed countries. The regulation of 
establishing the branches was a matter for 
individual  states.  As  a  result,  each  state 
had  different  types  and  degrees  of 
restrictions. In 1994, the part of the Riegle 
Neal  Interstate  Banking  and  Branching 
Efficiency Act removed these restrictions 
and  allowed  all  U.S.  banks  to  acquire 
banks  in  other  states  and  to  convert 
subsidiaries into branches. [8]  
These  financial  reforms  have  started  a 
change in the structure of the U.S. banking 
system:  universal  banks  have  originated 
together  with  nation-wide  branching.  It 
created  new  opportunities  for  financial 
institutions.  At  the  same  time,  it 
accentuated  the  functions  of  the  U.S. 
financial regulation and supervision.  
As  the  U.S.  central  bank,  Fed  has  a 
supervisory  and  regulatory  power  over  a 
wide  range  of  financial  institutions  and 
activities. It cooperates with other federal 
and  state  supervisory  authorities  in  the 
USA to ensure the safety and soundness of 
financial  institution,  stability  in  the 
financial  markets,  and  fair  and  equitable 
treatment  of  consumers  in  their  financial 
transactions. In case of domestic banking 
institutions,  the  Fed  shares  its KUČEROVÁ, Z.: The impact of financial crisis on financial supervision…  277 
responsibilities  with  the  Office  of  the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
(FDIC),  and  the  Office  of  Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) at the federal level, and 
with  the  banking  departments  of  the 
various states. [11]  
Table  1  summarizes  the  supervisory 
responsibilities of the Fed and other federal 
banking agencies. 
 
Federal supervisor and regulator of corporate              
components of banking organizations in the United States      Table 1 
Component  Supervisor and regulator 
Bank holding companies   Fed 
Nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies  Fed/Functional regulator 
National banks   OCC 
State member banks  Fed 
State non-member banks  FDIC 
Thrift holding companies  OTS 
Savings banks  OTS/FDIC/Fed 
Savings and loan associations  OTS 
Edge and agreement corporations   Fed 
Foreign banks
1)   
       Branches and agencies (state-licensed)
3)  Fed/FDIC 
       Branches and agencies (Federally licensed)
 3)  OCC/Fed/FDIC 
       Foreign banks – representative offices  Fed 
1) Applies to direct operations in the United States. Foreign banks may also have indirect 
operations in the United States through their ownership of U.S. banking organizations. 
2) The FDIC has responsibility for branches that are insured. 
Source: The Federal Reserve System 
 
The  Congress  created  the  Federal 
Financial  Institutions  Examination 
Council  (FFEIC)  in  1979  in  order  to 
promote  consistency  in  the  examination 
and supervision of banking organizations. 
The Council is a formal interagency body 
and  its  purposes  are  to  create  uniform 
federal  principles  and  standards  for  the 
examination  of  depository  institutions,  to 
promote  coordination  of  financial 
supervision  among  the  federal  agencies 
that regulate financial institutions, and to 
encourage better coordination of state and 
federal  regulatory  activities.  The  Council 
has additional statutory responsibilities to 
facilitate  public  access  to  data  that 
depository institutions must disclose.  
Over  the  years,  the  legislation  has 
resulted in a complex bank supervision in 
the  USA,  with  a  great  deal  of  overleap 
between  supervisory  authorities.  Banking 
regulators at the state and federal level had 
a  potentially  conflicting  mission  to 
promote safe and sound banking practices, 
while  other  agencies  had a  clear  mission 
but  limited  tools  and  jurisdiction. 
Therefore, it is necessary to build a new 
foundation  for  financial  regulation  and 
supervision  that  is  simpler  and  more 
effectively enforced, that protects financial 
consumers  and  investors,  that  ends 
loopholes allowing big Wall Street firms to 
escape supervision, that makes it clear that 
no firm is “too big to fail“, that is able to 
adapt and evolve with changes in the U.S. 
financial  market.  In  June  2009,  the  U.S. 
Department of the Treasury published an 
important  document  named  Financial 
Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding  Financial  Supervision  and 
Regulation  in  order  to  fight  the 
contemporary  financial  crisis.  This 
document  proposes  reforms  to  meet  five 
key objectives: 
1.  Promote  robust  supervision  and 
regulation of financial firms. 
2.  Establish  comprehensive  supervision  of 
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3.  Protect  consumers  and  investors  from 
financial abuse. 
4.  Provide the government with the tools it 
needs to manage financial crises. 
5.  Raise  international  regulatory  standards 
and improve international cooperation. 
It is proposed to create a new institution 
named  Financial  Service  Oversight 
Council  (FSOC)  of  financial  regulators 
(chaired  by  Treasury  and  including  the 
heads  of  the  principal  federal  financial 
regulators as members) to help fill the gaps 
in supervision, identify emerging systemic 
risks in the financial sector, identify firms 
whose  failure  could  pose  a  threat  to 
financial stability (due to their combination 
of size, leverage, and interconnectedness), 
improve  cooperation  among  the  principal 
federal  financial  regulatory  agencies, 
coordinate  policy  and  resolution  of 
disputes.  The  FSOC  should  replace  the 
President’s  Working  Group  on  Financial 
Markets. 
This document also proposes the creation 
of  two  new  agencies:  the  Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) and 
the National Bank Supervisor (NBS). The 
CFPA is an independent agency protecting 
consumers across the financial sector from 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. In 
other words, the CFPA is an agency with 
the power and accountability to make sure 
that  consumer  protection  regulations  are 
written  fairly  and  enforced  strongly.  The 
CFPA is designed to reduce gaps in federal 
supervision  and  enforcement,  improve 
coordination  with  the  states,  set  higher 
standards for financial intermediaries, and 
promote  consistent  regulation  of  similar 
products.  The  NBS  is  an  agency 
responsible  for  supervising  federally 
chartered  banks,  and  all  federal  branches 
and agencies of foreign banks. The NBS is 
going  to  take  over  the  prudential 
responsibilities  of  the  OCC,  which 
supervises nationally chartered banks and 
federal  branches  and  agencies  of  foreign 
banks, and also the responsibility for the 
institutions supervised by the OTS, which 
supervises  federally  chartered  thrifts  and 
thrift holding companies. 
Moreover,  the  Fed  will  be  given  new 
authorities  to  supervise  all  large  and 
interconnected  firms  that  could  pose  a 
threat to financial stability (and large banks 
with assets exceeding the amount of  $50 
billion), to oversee payment, clearing, and 
settlement systems, etc. These firms should 
not  be  able  to  escape  a  consolidated 
supervision  of  their  risky  activities  by 
manipulating  their  legal  structure  ever 
again.  Therefore,  the  largest,  most 
interconnected,  and  highly  leveraged 
financial  institutions  would  face  more 
severe  prudential  regulation,  including 
higher  capital  requirements  and  stronger 
consolidated supervision. These firms must 
be  forced  to  internalize  the  costs  they 
could transfer on a society in the event of 
failure.  
The proposals outlined in this report do 
not represent the complete set of potential 
reforms  in  financial  regulation.  More 
should  be  done  in  the  future.  It  is  also 
necessary  to  support  these  efforts  abroad 
and  to  improve  oversight  of  global 
financial markets.  
These  reforms  should  have  been 
approved  by  the  Congress  by  the  end  of 
2009 in order to come into force in 2010. 
President  Obama  is  trying  to  press  the 
Congress  to  enact  these  changes  in 
financial  markets  oversight  in  75  years, 
arguing that excessive risk-taking by banks 
and lax enforcement by regulators helped 
cause  the  credit  crisis  and  brought  the 
financial  system  to  the  edge  of  collapse. 
However, it has not been approved yet. It 
is  expected,  that  the  Senate  will  discuss 
this proposal in April 2010. 
 
3.3  Financial  Supervision  in  the  Czech 
Republic 
 
The  system  of  the  financial  market 
supervision  in  the  Czech  Republic  was 
broadly reorganised in 2006; the new laws 
entered  into  force  on  1  April  2006.  The 
main change was to reduce the number of 
financial  market  regulators  from  four  to 
one.  Before  April  2006,  there  were  four KUČEROVÁ, Z.: The impact of financial crisis on financial supervision…  279 
supervisory  institutions  in  the  Czech 
Republic:  the  Czech  National  Bank 
(supervision of banks), the Office for the 
Supervision  of  Insurance  and  Pension 
Funds  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance 
(supervision  of  insurance  companies  and 
pension  funds),  the  Czech  Securities 
Commission (capital market supervision), 
and  the  Office  for  the  Supervision  of 
Cooperative Banks (supervision of savings 
and  credit  cooperatives,  i.e.  the 
cooperatives  banks).  In  April  2006,  The 
Office for the Supervision of Insurance and 
Pension  Funds,  the  Czech  Securities 
Commission,  and  the  Office  for  the 
Supervision of Cooperative Banks ceased 
to  exist.  At  the  same  time,  Financial 
Market Committee was created as a new 
advisory  body  to  the  Bank  Board  of  the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) for financial 
market  supervision.  This  integration  of 
financial market supervision into a single 
authority  should  prevent  inefficient 
overlapping of competencies (apparent in 
the  USA)  and  create  a  basis  for  more 
efficient  supervision  over  financial 
institutions  and  markets  in  the  Czech 
Republic.  
Thus,  the  Czech  National  Bank  is  the 
only supervisory authority of the financial 
market  in  the  Czech  Republic. The  CNB 
supervises the banking sector, the capital 
market,  the  insurance  industry,  pension 
funds,  credit  unions,  bureaux-de-change, 
and  payment  system  institutions. 
Simultaneously, the CNB lays down rules 
safeguarding  the  stability  of  the  banking 
sector,  the  capital  market,  the  insurance 
industry and the pension scheme industry. 
It systematically regulates, supervises and, 
where  appropriate,  issues  penalties  for 
non-compliance with these rules. [13] 
Supervision of credit institutions covers 
banks, credit unions and electronic money 
institutions.  Credit  unions  differ  from 
banks  with  respect  to  their  legal  form 
(credit  unions  can  be  established only  as 
cooperative  societies),  the  amount  of 
capital they are required to have (CZK 35 
million = €1,4 million, as against CZK 500 
million = €20 million for banks) and the 
type  of  clients  for  which  they  are 
authorised  to  carry  out  activities  (for 
members  only).  Otherwise,  credit  unions 
are  subject  to  essentially  the  same 
requirements as banks, especially as far as 
the prudential rules are concerned. [14] 
By  performing  capital  market 
supervision,  the  CNB  strengthens  the 
confidence  of  investors  and  investment 
instrument  issuers  in  the  capital  market 
above all by contributing to the protection 
of  investors  and  the  development  of  the 
capital  market  and  promoting  public 
awareness  in  this  area.  It  means  in 
particular,  supporting  the  sound 
development  and  transparency  of  the 
capital  market,  market  discipline  and 
competitiveness  of  capital  market  service 
providers,  preventing  systemic  crises, 
supporting  issuing  activity,  protecting 
investors  and  clients  and  strengthening 
public confidence in the capital market.  
Banks and branches of foreign banks are 
required  to  participate  in  the  deposit 
insurance scheme; they contribute a fixed 
annual percentage of their deposits to the 
Deposits  Insurance  Fund.  The  main 
subject matter of the Fund’s activities is to 
compensate  authorized  persons  for  their 
receivables from deposits. [15] 
The  Czech  system  of  financial 
supervision does not have to be reformed, 
because  it  was  modified  in  2006  (before 
the  world  financial  crisis).  Now,  the 
system  of  supervision  is  very  simple, 
transparent, definite and well-functioning. 
Moreover,  the  Czech  financial  system  is 
sound, Czech banks – unlike the European 
and U.S. banks – generate profits. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The world financial crisis is a result of a 
lot  of  factors,  namely  large  financial 
innovations,  rapid  credit  expansion,  high 
liquidity,  low  interest  rates,  and 
insufficient  financial  supervision  etc. 
National  central  banks  have  not 
successfully  managed  the  area  of  macro-
prudential  supervision  and  regulation 
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foresee  the  financial  crisis  and 
consequently they failed to prevent it and 
contributed to the unsustainable credit and 
asset market boom that turned to the world 
financial  crisis.  Therefore,  governments 
and central banks at the international level 
have been trying to develop better policy 
responses  to  strengthen  the  financial 
stability in the world. 
We conclude that the system of financial 
supervision in the EU must be reformed in 
order  to  coordinate  the  different  national 
systems  of  all  EU  member  states.  By 
creating two institutions of the new system 
of  a  European  financial  supervision  it  is 
possible to ensure a fully connected macro-
micro  supervisory  framework  in  the  EU. 
The  same  holds  for  the  financial 
supervision  in  the  USA  that  is  quite 
complicated  because  of  the  dual  federal-
state banking system with a great deal of 
overleap  between  supervisory  authorities. 
The  Financial  Regulatory  Reform  brings 
several important innovations to the U.S. 
supervisory  system  and  raises  the 
supervisory power of the Fed. The Czech 
system  of  financial  supervision  does  not 
have  to  be  reformed,  because  it  was 
modified  in  2006  (before  the  crisis)  and 
now it is very simple, transparent, definite 
and well-functioning. 
However,  the  recovery  of  the  world 
financial  system  will  take  a  lot  of  time. 
And the public authorities should be aware 
of  the  fact  that  a  stronger  financial 
regulation  and  supervision  could  lay 
foundations  for  new,  more  complicated, 
less  transparent,  and  therefore  more 
dangerous financial innovations. 
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